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AUTOMATIC IMPOSITION OF NO-WORK CONDITIONS ON
BONDS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS: AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND DUE PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),' the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) may require an individual it believes is deportable to post a bond to ensure his appearance
at a deportation proceeding.2 The INS recently adopted rules (New
Rules) that automatically impose a no-work rider on such bonds. 3 A
no-work rider is a condition prohibiting an individual from working
until his status is adjudicated. 4 Under the New Rules, an individual
risks imprisonment if he is employed during this time. 5 In order for an
individual to be authorized to maintain employment during this period, he must prove the existence of compelling circumstances.

As the rules previously stood (Old Rules), no-work riders were

applied solely on a case-by-case basis. 7 Under the Old Rules, no-work
riders could be imposed only if a District Director of the INS obtained

1. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557
(1982)).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982).
3. 48 Fed. Beg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§
103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)); Mailman, Appearance Bonds; The No-Work Rider,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 6, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
4. Appleman, Bond Conditions ProhibitingUnauthorizedEmployment, 4 Immigration J. 1, 1 (1981); see 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 2, National Center for
Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as NCIR Brief].
5. 48 Fed. Beg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 2. Additionally, the bond may be forfeited if the District Director finds that there has been a
substantial violation of the bond conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e) (1983); 2 C. Gordon
& H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, § 6.15d, at 6-102 (rev. ed. 1984).
6. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
103.6(a) (2) (iii)); see NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 3. Factors examined in determining
whether compelling reasons exist include: the effect on the labor market, 48 Fed.
Beg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii)(A)), prior
immigration violations by the alien, id. (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
103.6(a)(2)(iii)(B)), the existence of a reasonable basis for discretionary relief, id. (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii)(C)), and the number and status of individuals supported by the alien. Id. (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii)(D)).
7. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142
(1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)) (factors to be considered in individual bond imposition); Appleman, supra note 4, at 1, 4 (explaining the
case-by-case analysis under the Old Rules); see, e.g., In re Vea, Interim Decision No.
2890, at 6-7 (B.I.A. 1981); In re Leon-Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241-43 (B.I.A.
1975).
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prior approval of a Regional Commissioner by establishing that certain conditions warranted such action." These conditions included the
occurrence of prior immigration violations, 9 the probability of subse-

quent violations,' 0 the lack of domestic dependents I and the negative
impact on the domestic labor market. 12
The New Rules arguably exceed the authority of the INS and
infringe on the rights of the individual in a deportation proceeding.
Assuming that the right to work is a protectable interest, the New

Rules may violate an individual's right to due process. 13 Moreover,

because the purposes underlying the imposition of bond conditions in
immigration cases are routinely limited to ensuring appearance at
subsequent proceedings 4 and safeguarding national security,' 5 the
8. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii), (iii) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142
(1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)); Appleman, supra note
4, at 1, 4; Mailman, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1.
9. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)); see In re Leon-Perez, 15 1. &
N. Dec. 239, 242 (B.I.A. 1975).
10. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)); see In re Leon- Perez, 15 I. &
N. Dec. 239, 242 (B.I.A. 1975).
11. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)); see In re Leon-Perez, 15 I. &
N. Dec. 239, 242 (B.I.A. 1975).
12. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)); see, e.g., In re Vea, Interim
Decision No. 2890, at 6 (B.I.A. 1981); In re Leon-Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 239, at 24142 (B.I.A. 1975).
13. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 4. See infra notes 74-143 and accompanying
text.
14. See National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip
op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983) ("conditions imposed on the bond must be
relevant to the purpose of securing the appearance of the alien"); In re Vea, Interim
Decision No. 2890, at 5 (B.I.A. 1981) ("[A]n alien should not be detained or required
to post bond . . . unless there is a finding that he is . . . a poor bail risk."); In re
Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666-67 (B.I.A. 1976) (imposition of bond condition must
be relevant to likelihood of appearance); In re Kwun, 13 I. & N. Dec. 457, 462
(B.I.A. 1969) (detention of an alien for other than security threats or poor bail risk is
not proper); In re Moise, 12 1. & N. Dec. 102, 104-05 (B.I.A. 1967) (alien determined
to be a poor bail risk and denied bond); S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 641
(1950) (bond for the release of an alien during deportation proceedings should be
conditioned upon the alien's appearance) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted in 1 0. Trelles & J. Bailey, Immigration and Nationality Acts Legislative
Histories and Related Documents 641 (1979); 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield , supra
note 5, § 8.16a, at 8-142 ("An obvious justification for the denial of bail is found
when there is a reasonable basis for suspecting that the alien will flee."); Mailman,
supra note 3, at 3, col. 1 (ensuring appearance at subsequent proceeding is a prime
objective of bond release). See generally NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 16-17 (explaining the purposes for detention and bond release).
15. In re Vea, Interim Decision No. 2890, at 5 (B.I.A. 1981) ("an alien should
not be detained or required to post bond ... unless there is a finding that he is a
threat to national security"); In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976)
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imposition of these rules may exceed the discretionary authority of the
INS. 6 Nevertheless, Congress granted the INS broad discretion to
determine appropriate bond conditions.' 7 Consequently, the New
Rules may be justified as a means to protect the domestic labor
market.'
This Note examines whether the imposition of automatic no-work
riders pending deportation proceedings exceeds the discretionary authority of the INS and violates the due process rights of the individual
subject to the deportation proceeding.' 9 Part I discusses the extent of
the INS discretion in imposing bond conditions and suggests that the
legislative history and case law limit the discretion to appearance and
national security concerns. Part II examines the protectable interests
of an individual subject to a no-work rider and determines that automatic implementation of no-work riders violates these interests. This
Note concludes that the New Rules exceed the authority of the INS

(alien may be denied bond if he is a risk to national security); In re Au, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 133, 137-38 (B.I.A. 1968) ("Denial of bail has been sustained by the courts only
where it has been demonstrated that the alien is not a good risk security-wise .... ");
see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541 (1952) ("[W]e conclude that the discretion
as to bail.. . justif[ies] [the Attorney General's] detention of all these parties... as
a menace to the public interest."); In re Kwun, 13 I. & N. Dec. 457, 462 (B.I.A.
1969) (detention is permissible when an alien is a national security risk); H.R. Rep.
No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1950) (change in the immigration law necessary
as a response to national security threats); S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1950) (need to control alien population is a factor in national security); 2 C. Gordon
& H. Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 8.16a, at 8-142 ("The courts have held that the
Attorney General may deny bail to active members of the Communist party.");
Avirom & Serviss, The Setting of Bond, Bond Redetermination, Breach and Recovery, in Practising Law Institute, Advanced Immigration 1980, at 39 (1980) (Course
Handbook No. 158) (national security is a factor in determining bond release);
Mailman, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1 (national security is a prime interest in bond
release determinations). See generally NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 16-17 (explaining
the purposes for detention and bond release).
16. See National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip
op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 12-19. See infra
notes 20-73 and accompanying text.
17. S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950); H. R. Rep. No. 1192, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); see In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 554 (Att'y
Gen. 1974).
18. See National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip
op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983); cf. In re
Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 555 (Att'y Gen. 1974) (justifying old rules as
protecting American labor).
19. Since the enactment of the New Rules, only one court has considered the
legality of the new system. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No.
83-7927, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983). The court preliminarily enjoined the
imposition of the New Rules and held that the plaintiff had a fair chance of proving
that such rules exceed the Attorney General's authority and violate the rights of the
alien. Id. at 9-10.

1012

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

and violate the due process right of the individual and therefore
should be rescinded. A preferable approach is to adopt a pre-deprivation case-by-case analysis, similar to that of the Old Rules.
I. THE AUTHORITY OF THE INS TO IMPOSE No-WoRK RIDERS
Section 242(a) of the INA grants the Attorney General discretion to

determine whether an individual in a deportation proceeding should
be released on bond,20 and if so, what conditions should be placed on
the bond. 2' The authority granted the Attorney General, however, is
limited. The Supreme Court in Carlson v.Landon 2 stated that a
decision of the Attorney General pursuant to such discretion can be
overridden "where it is clearly shown that it 'was without a reason-

able foundation.' "123
In determining whether a reasonable foundation exists, courts have
examined various factors,2 4 including the likelihood that the individual will be held deportable, 25 the nature of the charge against him,26

20. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982); 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 5, §
5.4d, at 5-61.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982); 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 5, §
5.4d, at 5-61.
22. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
23. Id. at 540-41. The Court stated:
The Government does not urge that the Attorney General's discretion is not
subject to any judicial review, but merely that his discretion can be overturned only on a showing of clear abuse.... [T]he language of the reports
is emphatic in explaining Congress' intention to make the Attorney Gen-

eral's exercise of discretion presumptively correct and unassailable except
for abuse.
Id. at 540; see Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd, 346
U.S. 929 (1954); United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747, 751
(2d Cir. 1948); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 14-15; 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield,
supra note 5, § 8.16a, at 8-141.
24. E.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541 (1952) (factor examined is
whether an individual is a "menace to the public interest"); United States ex rel.
Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.) (factor examined is
whether "release of an alien would be a danger to the national security"), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d
128, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1954) (one factor to be considered is whether an individual
refuses to answer questions about political affiliations); In re Marks, 198 F. Supp. 40,
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (factor to be considered is the criminal record of the alien); In re
Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979) (factors to be considered are legal
history, likelihood of appearance at subsequent proceedings, employment and family
ties); In re Patel, 15 1. & N. Dec. 666, 666-67 (B.I.A. 1976) (factor to be considered is
stay beyond visa expiration).
25. United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir.
1948).
26. Id.
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the danger to the public safety if he is released, 27 and his availability
for subsequent proceedings. 28 No court, however, has specifically established what constitutes a reasonable foundation. In order for the
INS to have a reasonable foundation on which to base the imposition
of no-work riders, it must be determined whether the rationale for
such imposition is consistent with the rationale for such authority.
A. Legislative and Judicial Development of INS Discretion Over

Bond Release
Section 242(a) of the INA originated in the Immigration Act of 1917
(Immigration Act).2 9 The Immigration Act established the authority
of the government agency responsible for immigration policy to release an individual on bond pending a deportation proceeding.3 0 The
purpose of the bond was to ensure an individual's appearance at

subsequent proceedings.3 1

32
Section 23 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (SACA)
amended the Immigration Act by granting the Attorney General discretion to determine whether an individual involved in deportation

proceedings should be placed in detention or released on bond with
conditions attached.3 3 This grant of discretion was intended to combat
27. Id.; see In re Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979) ("nature of...
criminal or immigration law history").
28. United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747, 751 (2d. Cir.
1948); In re Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979).
29. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat. 874, 890-91 (1917).
30. Id. In 1917, the authority to release on bond was vested in the Secretary of
Labor. Id. In 1940, the responsibility for administering the immigration laws was
transfered to the Attorney General. Reorganization Plan No. V, 5 Fed. Reg. 2223
(1940); see 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 1.6b, at 1-34.
31. Act of Feb 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat. 874, 891 (1917) (a bond should be
"conditioned that such alien shall be produced when required for a hearing or
hearings in regard to the charge"); see Senate Report, supra note 14, at 641 (bonds
for the release of aliens during deportation proceedings should be conditioned upon
appearance), reprintedin 1 0. Trelles & J. Bailey, supra note 14, at 641.
32. Ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010-12 (1950). Section 23 had its origins in the
Hobbs Bill, which expanded the Attorney General's authority over detention and
bond release of aliens. S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. Rep. No.
1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). The Hobbs Bill was incorporated in the Senate
version of SACA. S. Rep. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950). This section of the
Senate version was later incorporated in the final version of the bill. H.R. Rep. No.
3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950).
33. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 101012 (1950). This act added the express term "discretion" to the concept of bond
release. Compare id. at 1011 ("in the discretionof the Attorney General") (emphasis
added) with Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat. 874, 891 (1917) ("[an alien]
may be released under a bond") (emphasis added).
The lack of the express discretion term in the 1917 Act led to a disagreement
concerning the nature of bond release. One court held bond release to be a matter of
right. Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F.2d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 1926) (per curiam). Other
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a perceived threat to national security. 34 Congress feared that certain
aliens acting with discontented citizens posed an internal threat of

communism .3
Section 23 of SACA was incorporated into section 242(a) of the INA
upon its adoption in 1952.36 Thus, the legislative history suggests that
ensuring appearance and futhering national security are the two policies to be considered when determining whether an alien should be
37
detained or released on bond.

Subsequent to the passage of the INA, courts routinely affirmed the
discretionary detention of an alien because the alien was either a risk

courts held that the Immigration Act of 1917 permitted government discretion in the
issuance of such bonds. E.g., United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169
F.2d 747, 750 (2d Cir. 1948); United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director, 120
F.2d 762, 765 (2d Cir. 1941); United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 56 F. Supp. 403,
410 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 144 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1944); see Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 539-40 (1952) (explaining divergence in the case law).
34. See H.R. Rep. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1950) (SACA necessary to
control subversive foreigners). One congressional report stated:
The situation has now become so serious, with every indication that it will
increase rather than diminish in importance, that the committee feels that
the enactment of legislation of this type is a necessity, not only to the proper
administration of the immigration laws, but from the standpoint of the
national security of the United States.
S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950). The Carlson Court stated that the
Attorney General "must justify his refusal of bail by reference to the legislative
scheme to eradicate the evils of Communist activity." 342 U.S. 524, 543 (1950).
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950) ("The Communist
network in the United States is inspired and controlled in a large part by foreign
agents. .. . One device for infiltration by Communists is by procuring naturalization
for disloyal aliens .... "); S. Rep. No. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950) (substantial need to control the communist threat).
36. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)
(1982)); H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1952)("This provision, in
general, follows the procedure established by section 23 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950."), reprintedin 3 0. Trelles & J. Bailey, supra note 14, at 57; S.
Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (same)(1952), reprinted in 3 0. Trelles & J.
Bailey, supra note 14, at 29.
37. See H.R. Rep. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1950) (national security);
S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950) (same); Senate Report, supra note 14,
at 641 (appearance), reprinted in 1 0. Trelles & J. Bailey, supra note 14, at 641;
H.R. Rep. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949) (same); cf. Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 544 (1952) ("[T]he new legislation was designed to eliminate the subversive
activities of resident aliens .... "). Courts and commentators recognize that national
security and appearance at pending proceedings are factors in determining bond
release and detention. E.g., In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1981); In re
Kwun, 13 I. & N. Dec. 457, 462 (B.I.A. 1969); 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra
note 5, § 8.16a, at 8-142; Avirom & Serviss, supra note 15, at 39.
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to national security 3 or likely not to appear at a proceeding.39 Furthermore, the Board of Immigration Appeals authorized bond conditions solely for the purpose of ensuring appearance and protecting the

public. 40 In In re Toscano-Rivas,4 ' however, the Attorney General

stated that when dealing with bond release, a no-work rider could be
imposed to prohibit unauthorized employment in order to guard
42
against the displacement of workers in the domestic labor market.
The Attorney General attempted to distinguish past cases limiting
discretionary authority to appearance and national security interests

because these cases dealt solely with detention. 43 Because the no-work

rider is only a bond condition, detention analysis may be inapplicable.
After Toscano-Rivas, the INS adopted rules permitting imposition
of a bond condition prohibiting unauthorized employment by individuals pending a deportation proceeding. 44 The condition was imposed
on a case-by-case basis by establishing that certain factors warranting
imposition of the condition existed. 45 The legislative history concerning the Attorney General's authority and the judicial and administrative interpretations of it suggest that the automatic imposition of nowork riders may violate this discretionary authority.
B. The New Rules and the Attorney General's Discretionary

Authority
Automatic imposition of no-work riders may be justified by the
broad discretionary authority granted the Attorney General under the
immigration laws. 46 The Attorney General has stated that such au-

38. E.g., In re Vea, Interim Decision No. 2890, at 5 (B.I.A. 1981); In re Patel, 15
I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976); In re Kwun, 13 I. &. N. Dec. 457, 462 (B.I.A.
1969).
39. In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976); see In re Moise, 12 I. &
N. Dec. 102, 104 (B.I.A. 1967).
40. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 16; see, e.g., In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666,
666 (B.I.A. 1976); In re Kwun, 13 I. & N. Dec. 457, 462 (B.I.A. 1969).
41. 14 I. & N. Dec. 523 (B.I.A. 1972, rev'd, id. at 550 (Att'y Gen. 1974)).
42. Id. at 555.
43. Id. at 555-56. The INS, however, has acknowledged that no-work riders are
a condition of release. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
44. 39 Fed. Reg. 19,201 (1974) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1983)),
amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2),
109. 1(b)(8)).
45. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)). See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. The rider could only be imposed if the District Director received prior
approval of the Regional Commissioner. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1983), amended
by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2),
109.1(b)(8)); see Appleman, supra note 4, at 4.
46. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540 (1952) ("[Congress intended] to
make the Attorney General's exercise of discretion presumptively correct and unas-
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thority "afford[s] an independent basis for requiring of persons subject
to deportation proceedings bonds prohibiting unauthorized employment. ' 47 Under section 242(a) of the INA, no limitations on the condi48

tions for release prohibit the INS from implementing such rules.

Moreover, the legislative history clearly states that
the INS is to have
49
broad discretion in establishing bond conditions.
In addition, the adverse affects of alien employment on the United
States labor market may justify the automatic imposition of the nowork rider.5 0 The Attorney General contends that "a basic purpose of
the immigration law is to protect against the displacement of workers

in the United States." 5' If the protection of the labor market is indeed

a valid justification for the imposition of a bond-release condition,
such restriction should be imposed only if the alien awaiting a deportation proceeding actually threatens the employment of American
citizens.
Discretion, however, may not permit the INS automatically to
impose no-work riders in all cases. 52 The New Rules impose no-work

riders on all individuals released on bond during the pendency of a

deportation proceeding. 53 No evaluation of the charges or examination of the individual's status is made prior to the imposition of the

sailable except for abuse."); In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 554 (Att'y
Gen. 1974) ("reports clearly demonstrate a Congressional intent to grant wide discretion"); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982) (Attorney General "shall establish such regulations
...
and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority"); S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949) (same).
47. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983) (quoting In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 523, 555 (Att'y Gen. 1974)).
48. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982).
49. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
50. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983); see In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec.
523, 555 (Att'y Gen. 1974); 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(14)(B) (1982).
51. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983) (quoting In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 523, 555 (Att'y Gen. 1974)).
52. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 543 (1952) (Attorney General does not
have "untrammeled" discretion); Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449, 455 (D.C.
Cir. 1953) ("[D]iscretion ... is a reasonable discretion, not an arbitrary and capricious one."), aff'd mem., 346 U.S. 929 (1954); United States ex rel. Hydmon v.
Holton, 205 F.2d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1953) (Attorney General is not left with absolute
discretion); National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip
op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983) (no-work riders may violate the statutory author-

ity).
53. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at
8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 2, 13; see 48 Fed. Reg.
51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii)) ("A condition
barring employment shall be included in an appearance and delivery bond ...
unless the District Director determines that employment is appropriate."). But see 48
Fed Reg. 51,142, 51,143 (1983) (New Rules exempt permanent resident aliens).
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condition . 4 The individual, therefore, is automatically denied employment while trying to exercise his possibly valid right to remain in
this country. While it may be reasonable to impose no-work riders on
individuals when their employment has been established to be unauthorized, 55 it is questionable whether the Attorney General's discretionary authority justifies the imposition of such a condition on all
individuals released on bond regardless of their status.56 Attributing a
certain characteristic to all members of a certain class in order to
justify their identical treatment violates the concept of reasonableness. 57 For example, a system that incarcerates all alien communists
without a showing that they, as individuals, pose threats to national
security is an abuse of INS discretion. 58 Similarly, a system that pro-

hibits employment of any individual released on bond without evaluating whether the individual poses a threat to the domestic labor
market also may constitute an abuse of discretion. 59

54. See NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 13-14 (individual's status is determined
without preliminary hearing); 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (same) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii)).
55. See In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 524 (B.I.A. 1972), reo'd on
other grounds, id. at 550 (Att'y Gen. 1974) (no-work riders approved when aliens
conceded deportability). The rules adopted subsequent to Toscano-Rivas only restricted "unauthorized employment." 8 C.F.R. 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1983), amended by 48
Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)).
56. The Supreme Court has suggested that the discretion granted the Attorney
General is reasonable when applied on a case-by-case approach. See Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952). As Justice Frankfurter stated in Carlson: "The
factors relevant to the exercise of discretion are factors that pertain to each individual
as an individual." Id. at 562 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); of. United States ex rel.
Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1954) (proof of an individual's actual threat to national security is required); Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d.
449, 451, 455-56 (D.C Cir. 1953) (same), aff'd mem., 346 U.S. 929 (1954); United
States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747, 751 (2d. Cir. 1948) (factors
for the determination of bail and detention questions).
57. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (cannot characterize all
aliens as a threat to national security).
58. See id. (purpose to injure cannot be imputed to all aliens); id. at 558 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (undiscriminating and unindividualized standard violates congressional intent); cf. United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128,
129-30 (2d Cir. 1954) (cannot impute a threat to national security from an alien's
refusal to answer questions about his affiliations); Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d
449, 451, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (conviction for draft evasion cannot lead to an
assumption that the alien is a threat to national security), aff'd mem., 346 U.S. 929
(1954); United States ex tel. Daniman v. Esperdy, 113 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (past communist activity cannot be used to impute a present subversive threat);
United States ex rel. Schneider v. Esperdy, 108 F. Supp. 640, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(same).
59. Toscano-Rivas upheld the imposition of no-work riders as a means to protect
the domestic labor market. In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 1. & N. Dec. 523, 555 (Att'y Gen.
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Moreover, while Toscano-Rivas stated that no-work riders could be
imposed without exceeding the discretionary authority of the Attorney
General, 60 it also warned against "undue utilization" of such conditions.6 1 Given this language, the Attorney General's opinion in Toscano-Rivas cannot be construed to support automatic imposition of
no-work riders.
Futhermore, the alleged threat to the domestic labor market from
alien employment may not be a proper basis for automatic imposition
of no-work riders.6 2 The legislative history of the pertinent immigration laws suggests that the primary purposes of allowing detention and
release on conditional bond are to safeguard national security 63 and to
guarantee an individual's appearance at a subsequent proceeding.6 4
No-work riders may bear little relevance to either of these purposes.65

1974). The rules adopted in response to Toscano-Rivas recognized the impact on
displacement of workers as a factor in the potential imposition of no-work riders. See
8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)). By determination of the potential
threat to the labor market posed by each individual released on bond, the Old Rules
fairly considered each individual's potential threat. See id.
By imposing no-work riders automatically, however, the New Rules fail to consider whether a particular individual poses a potential threat to the domestic labor
market. See 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
103.6(a)(2)(ii)). Therefore, if discretion requires individual analysis, see supra notes
56-59 and accompanying text, and no-work riders are meant to limit threats to the
labor market, see In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 555 (Att'y Gen. 1974); 48
Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983), the individual's threat to the labor market must be
examined to establish a reasonable grounds for the discretionary action. See In re
Vea, Interim Decision No. 2890, at 6 (B.I.A. 1981) (adverse impact of the alien's
employment on the labor market was necessary for the rider's imposition under the
Old Rules); In re Leon-Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241 (B.I.A. 1975) (under the Old
Rules, the INS had to establish employment impact to justify imposition of the rider);
Appleman, supra note 4, at 18 (same).
60. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 555; see Appleman, supra note 4, at 4.
61. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 557. The Board of Immigration Appeals has interpreted
Toscano-Rivas to hold that "the utmost care [must] be taken in imposing bond
conditions prohibiting employment." In re Leon-Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241
(B.I.A. 1975); see In re Vea, Interim Decision No. 2890 at 6 (B.I.A. 1981); Appleman, supra note 4, at 20.
62. The traditionally-accepted bases for determining detention and bond-release
questions are national security, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, and
assurance of appearance, see supra note 14 and accompanying text. Additionally, the
INS does not examine any potential economic threat when imposing a bond on an
alien. See In re Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979) (listing factors
examined by INS).
63. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
65. See In re Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 667 (B.I.A. 1976) (alien's employment,
even though he lacked a labor certificate, rendered his appearance at subsequent
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Although the Attorney General in Toscano-Rivas distinguished past

decisions because they dealt with detention rather than bond condi-

tions, 8 the INS acknowledges that no-work riders are a condition of
release.6 7 Thus, the alien's adherence to a no-work rider determines
whether he will be detained or released. The legislative purposes of
protecting national security and ensuring appearance at a subsequent
proceeding, therefore, are relevant to determining the validity of
automatic no-work riders.
While concern for the domestic labor market may implicate na-

tional security interests, 68 the economic effect of alien employment in

the American economy has yet to be determined.69 An alien who
accepts work in the United States may have no effect on the employment opportunities of citizens and permanent residents. 7 One commentator has stated that "[e]xperiments conducted by INS show little,
if any, damage to citizens even in the few areas where immigrants-

legal and illegal-concentrate."7 ' In addition, American citizens often

will not accept the job that an alien vacates because of its low salary
level and the availability to Americans of various governmental
proceedings more likely); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 16 (quoting Patel, 15 I. & N.
Dec. at 667). A factor in determining the necessity of a bond is employment. See In re
Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979).
Historically, detention has been used to safeguard the national security interest in
preventing subversion. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542 (1952) ("no denial
of... due process. . . where there is reasonable apprehension of hurt from aliens
charged with a philosophy of violence"); United States ex rel. Belfrage v.
Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1954) (alien released because there was
no danger that he would "engage in the interim in activities inimical to the public
welfare"); Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449, 451, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(alien's conviction for evading the draft was not an adequate threat to national
security), aff'd mere., 346 U.S. 929 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
1-3 (1950) (strong national goal to prevent communism is apparent); 96 Cong. Rec.
15,297 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Walters) (changes in the immigration laws are needed
to address "a different concept of world revolution").
66. In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 555-56 (Att'y Gen. 1974).
67. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983) ("Where the 'no work' condition is
violated, the appropriate response would be to take the alien into custody.").
68. See S. Rep. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983).
69. Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress, Illegal
Aliens: Estimating Their Impact on the United States 19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Comptroller Report]; see California Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, A Study of Federal Immigration Policies and Practices in
Southern California 8 (1980) [hereinafter cited as California Report]; P. Ehrlich, L.
Bilderback & A. Ehrlich, The Golden Door 196 (1979).
70. See NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 20-22; Comptroller Report, supra note 69,
at 19-20. In fact, recent studies indicate that aliens have a positive impact on the
domestic economy. Simon, Don't Close Our Borders, Newsweek, Feb. 27, 1984, at
11; New York Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at A17, col. 1.
71. Simon, supra note 70, at 11.
72. Comptroller Report, supra note 69, at 19 (quoting economist Hans F. Sennholz); Simon, supra note 70, at 11. In 1975, 65.2 % of the illegal aliens in the United
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benefits.7 3 Thus, such individuals do not displace American workers.
Accordingly, it is questionable whether automatic no-work riders
satisfy a legitimate national interest.
Automatic no-work riders thus appear to be an impermissible extension of the discretionary authority of the Attorney General. They
arbitrarily restrict the ability of individuals to maintain employment
pending deportation proceedings. Moreover, they expand the scope of
national security interests to encompass an undetermined economic
threat. Such a system cannot be classified as being based on a "reasonable foundation."
II. No-WoRK

RiDERS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law."1 4 It is well established that the due process protection of the
fifth amendment extends to individuals in deportation proceedings.7
In examining the relationship between automatic no-work riders and
due process restrictions, it initially must be determined whether the
employment interests of the individual pending a deportation proceeding are constitutionally protected. If such an interest is constitutionally protected, procedural safeguards must exist.
A. The Protected Interests

1. The Right to Work as a Property Interest
Employment authorization may grant certain classes of aliens an
entitlement interest in their employment.70 An entitlement is a proStates made less than $2.50 per hour. Id. at 18. Some commentators state that they
never interviewed an alien whose annual income exceeded $5,000. P. Ehrlich, L.
Bilderback & A. Ehrlich, supra note 69, at 194. Jobs vacated by aliens generally are
not filled by citizens. California Report, supra note 69, at 8-9; see Comptroller
Report, supra note 69, at 19.
73. Comptroller Report, supra note 69, at 19 (social services and unemployment
insurance).
74. U.S. Const. amend. V.
75. E.g., Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1953); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 49-50 (1950); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942); Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931); The Japanese Immigrant Case,
189 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1903); IA C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 5.5, at 566 to -67; J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 1090
(2d ed. 1983); see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952).
76. Employment authorization is analogous to a driver's license. Compare National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 16, 1983) (employment authorization) with Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(driver's license). Instead of giving the holder the right to drive, employment authori-
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tected property interest in a governmental grant of permission or
monetary support. 7 Certain classes of aliens are authorized to work
incident to their status,7 8 or have sought and received such authorization.7 9 For example, an alien with an exceptional or technical skill is

given the right to work as part of his non-immigrant status.80 In
addition, an alien attending school in the United States may seek
authorization for employment."' Once authorization for employment
is granted, it can be terminated only for good cause. 2 Thus, the
statutory authorization to work and the statutory safeguards against
improper revocation of this authorization by their nature suggest that
the alien has an entitlement interest in the employment authorization
meriting constitutional protection.
By contrast, an alien's interest in maintaining employment pending
a deportation proceeding may be merely a privilege. 83 The alien's

zation gives the holder the right to obtain employment. Driver's licenses have been
held to be entitlements. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539 ("This is but an application of the
general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement .. ").Additionally, in order to revoke an occupational license,
fair procedure is required. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968). See
generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.Young, supra note 75, at 549-50 (discussion of
entitlements); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1255-56 (1965) (same) [hereinafter cited as Reich I]; Reich,
The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 739-44 (1964) (same) [hereinafter cited as Reich
II].
77. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-9, at 515 (1978) ("[T]he
Court recognized as entitlements interests founded neither on constitutional nor on
common law claims of right but only on a state-fostered (and hence justifiable)
expectation, as opposed to a mere hope ....")(footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (driver's license revocation affects interests that are
important enough to require procedural due process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262-63 (1970) (interest in continued welfare payments is important and due
process is required prior to termination of these benefits). An entitlement exists only
to the extent that it is statutorily authorized. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young,
supra note 75, at 549-50; L. Tribe, supra, § 10-9, at 515; see Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (dictum).
78. 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(a) (1983).
79. Id. § 109.1(b).
80. Id. § 109.1(a)(6)(x) (1983); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J) (1982) (defining
class of skilled non-immigrants).
81. 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(1)(ii) (1983).
82. Id. § 109.2(a). If the individual's authorization is to be terminated, notice
and an opportunity to rebut the charges are required. Id. § 109.2(b).
83. Cf. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (practice of medicine is a privilege given by the state); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass.
216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (continued government service is not a constitutionally protected right). A distinction existed in due process theory "between individual 'rights' stemming from constitutional or common law sources and mere 'privileges' bestowed by government ... "L. Tribe, supra note 77, § 10-8, at 509-10. The
government does not have to provide protection for a mere privilege. See Bailey v.
Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (government employment is not a
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authority to work is within the sole discretion of the United States
government. 4 This governmental authorization vests no right to conthe alien may
tinued employment in the individual. 5 Consequently,
86
have only an expectancy interest in employment.
The entitlement theory, however, dispenses with the right-privilege
distinction. Entitlements are awards of governmental largesse.8 7 The
recognition of reliance on such awards differentiates an entitlement
from a privilege. 8s In the case of employment authorization, reliance
is so substantial that withdrawal of the grant would cause hardship., 9

protectable interest under the fifth amendment), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964, 966
(D.D.C. 1949) (the government may fire employees "if it [sees] fit" for making
"protected utterances"), aff'd, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 923 (1951); Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 A.D. 373, 375,
25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (1941) (welfare payments are a privilege and equated with

charity); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1440 (1968) (privileges are unprotected). This
distinction may be regaining acceptance. See generally Smolla, The Reemergence of

the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too
Much, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1982). But see Van Alstyne, supra, at 1442 (rightprivilege distinction is no longer functional).
84. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 109.1(b), 109.2(a) (1983).

85. See id.
86. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (defining expectancy
as a mere unilateral need or desire); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.Young, supra note
75, at 547-48 (same). A non-statutory expectancy does not give the individual an
interest in continued benefits. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974);

Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445, 463-64 (1977) (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S.
at 151-52).
87. Reich II, supra note 76, at 785; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8
(1970); Reich I, supra note 76, at 1255.
88. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-03 (1972) (reliance on de facto
tenure plan); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (reliance on driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (it would be "unconscionable" to stop
welfare payments without a prior hearing considering the substantial need of the
welfare recipient) (quoting trial court); Reich II, supra note 76, at 737 ("Hardly any
citizen leads his life without at least partial dependence on wealth flowing through
the... government ....").
89. See National Center for Immigrant's Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip
op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983) (With respect to the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the court noted that "there is sufficient evidence of the possibility that the
regulations will impose irreparable harm to those who fall within the purview of the
no-work condition."); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 8-11 (discussing the degree of
harm no-work riders would cause individuals); cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
492 (1959) (lack of security clearance "seriously affected, if not destroyed" the
plantiffs pursuit of a chosen career); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) ("right
to work for a living" an essential part of personal freedom); Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889) (right to continued employment "is often of great value" to
the holder of the right).
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Institutional procedural safeguards, therefore, must limit arbitrary
withdrawal. ° Furthermore, because such authorization cannot be
withdrawn unless "good cause" is established, the alien has more than
a mere expectancy in continued employment. 91 Thus, any acts affecting these interests must satisfy certain minimum due process requirements.
2. The Right to Work as a Liberty Interest
The right to work is generally a protected liberty interest. 92 The
Supreme Court has stated that liberty "denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right . . . to engage in any of the
common occupations of life." 93 Because the individual in a deportation proceeding is entitled to due process protection,9 4 he arguably
should not be denied his right to work pending such a proceeding
without adequate procedural review.
By contrast, the INS contends that such an individual is not entitled
to maintain employment pending a deportation proceeding due to his
illegal presence in the country. 95 This position, however, assumes that

90. Such safeguards presently exist to prevent arbitrary withdrawal of work
authorization. See 8 C.F.R. § 109.2 (1983). These institutional safeguards, however,
do not apply to the no-work riders. See 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)). The new system is automatic and
affords no notice or opportunity to address the charges prior to revocation in the
context of contemplated deportation. See 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)).
91. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (for an individual
"[t]o have a property interest in a benefit ... [he] must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it, . . . [and] more than a unilateral expectation .... "). Conversely, if a statute permits termination without cause or for any reason, no right to
continued benefits is granted to the individual. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
345-47 (1976); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 75, at 547. This,
however, is not the case with work authorization. See 8 C.F.R. § 109.2(a) (1983).
92. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
41 (1915); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888);
United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1975); National Center for
Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983);
Whetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 549 F.2d
797 (3d Cir. 1977); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 24-25 (quoting Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. at 492); see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 n.11 (1967) (right to
earn a living is a protected interest) (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 492);
Onweiler v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Idaho 1977) (same); Endicott
v. Van Petten, 330 F. Supp. 878, 883-84 (D. Kan. 1971) (same); Mailman, supra note
3, at 3, col. 2 (same).
93. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
94. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
95. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at
7-8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,143 (1983) (INS contending
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the individual is, in fact, illegally present in the country. 9 Pending
adjudication at a deportation proceeding, this issue has not yet been
resolved. 7 The government has the initial burden of proving at the
deportation proceeding that the individual is in the country illegally. 8
By denying such an individual the right to work through the imposition of a no-work rider, however, the INS is determining illegality
prior to proper adjudication of the issue. 99 The liberty interest in the
right to continued employment should exist until an immigration
judge determines illegal status.

B. What Process Is Due
The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,00 enunciated three
factors for determining the due process -safeguards required in an
administrative proceeding:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the

no-work rider will prevent employment of illegal aliens). Prior to the issuance of an
appearance bond, the INS conducts an investigation, see IA C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 5.2, at 5-15 to -35, and issues an order to show cause, 8
C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1983). This order commences the deportation proceedings. Id.
The order to show cause includes the charges and factual allegations, id. § 242.1(b),
and is issued by an authorized INS officer, id. § 242.1(a), "upon a prima facie
showing of deportability," IA C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 5.3b, at 536.
96. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at
8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); see NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 14; Mailman, supra
note 3, at 3, col. 3.
97. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966) (establishing degree of proof
in deportation proceeding); 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1983) (same); Note, Deportation:
ProceduralRights of Reentering Permanent Resident Aliens Subjected to Exclusion
Hearings, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 1339, 1344 (1983) ("[A] decision of deportability is
invalid unless it is based on 'clear, unequivocal and convincing' evidence.") (quoting
8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1982)). This determination is made solely by an Immigration
Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (1983). Until a constitutionally-mandated hearing before
the Immigration Judge is held, see The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86,100
(1903), it cannot be assumed that an individual is an illegal alien. See Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. at 285-86; National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 837927, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982); NCIR Brief,
supra note 4, at 13-14; Wildes, The Exclusion and Deportation Processes-Basic
Procedures,in Practising Law Institute, Thirteenth Annual Immigration and Naturalization Institute 425 (Course Handbook No. 167) (1980).
98. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923).
99. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 14; see National Center for Immigrants Rights,
Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983).
100. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.' 0 '
The Mathews test balances the individual's constitutional interests
against the government's interests in avoiding an undue administra-

tive burden. 102
1. The Private Interest at Stake
The private interest implicated by automatic no-work riders is the

individual's ability to maintain employment pending a deportation

proceeding. 10 3 This interest is not just a general right to a certain job,
but also is a "right to work in order to eat, have shelter, [receive]
medical care ... and. . . provide for one's children."' 10 4 If an alien is
automatically denied the right to work, he may be unable to support
himself and his family. 10 5 Moreover, the circumstances surrounding

the imposition of an automatic no-work rider may be grave because
the delay between imposition of the rider and possible post-depriva-

0
tion relief may be several weeks. 1°
This ability to work to ensure survival is analogous to the right of
the welfare recipient to receive benefits pending a termination proceeding.' 0 7 The Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly'0 8 that a
welfare recipient is entitled to an evidentiary hearing by an indepen-

dent factfinder prior to termination of welfare benefits. 0 9 The ration-

101. Id. at 335.
102. Id. at 335, 348; J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 75, at 560; see
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 28, 47-48 (1976); cf. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (applying the Mathews balancing test in the context of an electrical
shut-off).
103. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at
8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 24.
104. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 24.
105. Id. at 11-12. The plight of the individual denied his employment rights is
substantial, going beyond lack of support for his family. Id. at 8-12 (problems
include inability to procure counsel); see National Center for Immigrants Rights,
Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 8-9, 11-12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983). Additionally, aliens may be deported for becoming public charges within five years of entry
unless they can affirmatively prove that the reason for their poverty arose after entry.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(8) (1982).
106. See National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip
op. at 8-9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 29-30.
107. NCIR Brief, supra note 4 at 29.
108. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
109. Id. at 266-71; L. Tribe, supra note 77, § 10-9, at 516-17.
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ale for this high degree of due process protection is that "termination
of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits.""10 Similarly, an individual in a deportation proceeding is sub-

ject to a denial of his fundamental ability to support himself, 1 ' and

therefore, should be entitled to the same degree of due process protection.
An illegal alien, however, may have no legally protected interest in
maintaining employment." 2 Futhermore, the interests of a welfare
recipient may be distinguished from the interests of an alien: A welfare recipient has received an affirmative grant of benefits from the4
government,"

3

while an alien may not have received such a grant.1

An analogy may be made to the termination of disability benefits. As
is the case with welfare benefits and employment, disability benefits
may represent the recipient's primary means of support. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has held that the interests involved do not require
pre-deprivation factfinding." 5 Accordingly, such factfinding may not
be necessary for the protection of the alien's interests.
The INS, however, should not be able to assume, prior to a fair
0
adjudication, that the individual is in fact in the country illegally."
Moreover, while the benefits given to the welfare recipient and the

110. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis in original).
111. The Supreme Court stated in Goldberg that: "Since [the welfare recipient]
lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need
to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects
his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy." 397 U.S. at 264. The
individual in deportation proceedings who is barred from employment also loses the
means to support himself. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 11-12, 29. In general, aliens
are paid low wages. See P. Ehrlich, L. Bilderback & A. Ehrlich, supra note 69, at
194; California Report, supra note 69, at 8. Low wages coupled with a ban on
employment render an individual released on bond incapable of supporting himself.
See NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 11-12. Additionally, he may be unable to procure
counsel and and thus may be forced to abandon his right to a deportation hearing.
See Id.
112. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
113. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1970) (welfare recipients already receiving aid when benefits were terminated).
114. Some aliens may be admitted to the country and not receive work authorization unless they apply for it. 8 C.F.R. §109.1(b) (1983). Additionally, there is an
existing problem of illegal immigration into the United States. See P. Ehrlich, L.
Bilderback & A. Ehrlich, supra note 69, at 182-90 (explaining the various estimates
of the number of illegal aliens in the country). It therefore appears possible for nowork riders to be applied to those who lack work authorization.
115. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976).
116. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at
7-8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 13-14. See supra notes
96-99 and accompanying text.
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alien may be distinguishable, the interests in the ability to ensure
survival are identical. In addition, the interests of the individual
receiving disability benefits may be distinguished because such an
individual may have other means of support. 117 The protected interest
of the alien pending a deportation proceeding, therefore, must be
considered substantial.
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
While no-work riders automatically prohibit individuals who post
bond in a deportation proceeding from maintaining employment,""
certain provisions in the New Rules safeguard the individual's interests. The alien is permitted to continue employment if he establishes
that "compelling reasons" exist to justify his reauthorization. " 9 In
addition, the individual may request that an Immigration Judge review the INS' bond determination. 120 The Immigration Judge then
may alter the bond to permit continued employment.
These safeguards, however, fall well below the due process requirements necessary to protect the interests of the individual awaiting a
deportation proceeding.'12 The District Director is not an independent

117. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976). The Mathews Court
distinguishes the disability benefits situation from Goldberg because the circumstances of a disabled individual are not necessarily similar to those of a welfare
recipient. Id. at 340. The disabled, according to the Court, may have other sources of
support, such as savings, tort claims and workman's compensation. Id. at 341. The
alien, like the welfare recipient, is in a more dire circumstance than the disabled
individual. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the decision to terminate a disabled person's benefits is based on an
objective medical investigation. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. In the case of termination
of welfare benefits or imposition of no-work riders, subjective determinations of
credibility and veracity must be made which are not present in a medical evaluation.
Compare Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269-70 and NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 13-14 with
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-45. Thus, the risk of error is less in an objective medical
evaluation than it is in a subjective evaluation. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344-45.
118. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
119. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
103.6(a)(2)(iii)); see National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 837927, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 3. The
District Director examines such factors as the effect on the domestic economy, past
violations of the immigration laws, the need for discretionary relief and continued
support of dependent residents. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at
8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii)).
120. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1983); see National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc.
v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983). Immigration Judges are
not under the authority of the INS. See 48 Fed. Reg. 8038, 8039-40 (1983) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0, 3.9-.10).
121. An individual subjected to a no-work rider, arguably, should receive due
process protection comparable to that of a welfare recipient. NCIR Brief, supra note
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factfinder. 2 2 He has a vested interest in the case because his office has
brought the action against the alien. 2 3 While review by the Immigra124
tion Judge is independent, this review can only be post-deprivation
and may not take
place for several weeks after the imposition of the
25
no-work rider.

In certain cases, however, post-deprivation review can afford adequate protection. 2 6 For example, a holder of a driver's license who

4, at 29; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) ("[T]he degree of
potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be
considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process.").
See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. Such a procedure need not "take the
form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266

(1970).
122. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (1983); National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v.
INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("[The factfinder] should not ... have participated in making
the determination under review.").
123. The District Director or his subordinate is the issuer of the charge against the
individual. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1983); IA C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 5,
§ 5.3b, at 5-36. The District Director also imposes the bond on which the no-work
rider is automatically placed. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1983); 1A C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 5, § 5.4d, at 5-61. The District Director's involvement in the
investigation that results in the imposition of the no-work rider is the reason that he
cannot be considered adequately independent. See National Center for Immigrants
Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983) (review by
District Director does not satisfy due process requirements); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (welfare official who is acting in a pre-termination evidentiary hearing should not have participated in making the determination under re-

view).
124. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1983) (application to the Immigration Judge is made
after the initial determination by the District Director).
125. See National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip
op. at 8-9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 28.
126. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 299-300 (1981) (due process does not require a hearing in an emergency situation); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (no due process violation when a
prisoner was deprived of his property by prison personnel not following the established state procedure); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1979) (summary
suspension of a driver's license permissible upon refusal to take a breath-analysis
test); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1979) (suspension of a horse trainer
allowed on the evaluation of an expert without a hearing); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 606-07 (1979) (adversary hearing not required for admission of a minor to a state
hospital when there is prior medical evaluation by a physician acting as a neutral
factfinder); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113, 115 (1977) (suspension of driver's
license based upon multiple traffic violations allowed without a prior hearing);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (no prior hearing necessary for the
physical punishment of a school child); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344, 349
(1976) (recipient of disability payments not entitled to a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing when the termination decision is based on a medical evaluation); cf. North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1975) (no prior
hearing is required for garnishment provided other safeguards exist); Mitchell v.
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violates a traffic ordinance does not receive pre-suspension evaluation
when he refuses to take a breath-analysis test.12 7 Likewise, the recipient of disability insurance is not entitled28to pre-deprivation review
prior to the suspension of such payments.
The imposition of automatic no-work riders, however, may be
distinguished from such cases. Automatic no-work riders affect a critical interest'2 9 and pose a high risk of erroneous application. 30 The
interests affected in situations when post-deprivation review is considered adequate are not as vital to the individual as his interest in
supporting himself and his family.' 3' Moreover, the risk of erroneous

deprivation in such situations is less than the risk from automatic
imposition of bond conditions. 32 Thus, the risk of erroneous deprivation of a critical interest is great when dealing with automatic imposition of no-work riders.
3. Government Interests
The interest of the government' 33 in imposing no-work riders is twofold. Initially, automatic no-work riders attempt to prevent displace-

W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 618-20 (1974) (no prior hearing for writ of sequestration); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 163-64 (1974) (government employee limited
to the procedure that is established in the statute governing dismissal from his job).
127. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1979).
128. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
129. See supra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
130. No-work rider implementation is automatic. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. There is no prior evaluation of the individual factors involved in each
case. See 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
103.6(a)(2)); NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 2, 13-14. Moreover, the evaluation in the
no-work rider case is subjective. See id.
131. See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text. An individual's interest in his
driver's license is not as substantial as his interest in his ability to support himself. See
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113
(1977). Moreover, the right to continued disability benefits, although substantial, is
not considered as substantial as the welfare recipient's right to continued benefits. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976). Such a lesser interest allows for
termination without a prior evidentiary hearing. Id. at 349.
132. Compare National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927,
slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983) (high risk of erroneous deprivation with
automatic no-work riders) with Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65 (1979) (preliminary
evaluation based on expert objective opinion is sufficiently reliable) and Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 14 (1979) (personal liability for erroneous judgment reduces
risk of error) and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (independent medical
evaluation will protect individual from erroneous decision) and Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 678 (1977) (same) and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45
(1976) (low risk of erroneous deprivation in termination of disability benefits).
133. The Supreme Court has allowed the deprivation of protected individual
interests without a prior hearing when there is an established governmental or public
interest which would be protected by summary adjudication. See Hodel v. Virginia
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ment of American workers in the domestic labor market. 34 While it is
uncertain whether the Attorney General may base his actions on such
concerns, 135 the government clearly has a strong interest in the protection of the American worker. 36 In addition, automatic no-work riders
seek to reduce the cost of a presumably more burdensome case-by-case
procedure.1 37 When formulating administrative rules, minimization
of the burden to be placed on government agencies is a valid consider3
ation.
The imposition of automatic no-work riders based on these interests, however, is questionable. It is uncertain whether alien employment has an adverse effect on the American worker. 3 Moreover,
because no-work riders affect only those aliens awaiting deportation
hearings, the riders do not significantly limit illegal alien employment. 140 In addition, while automatic no-work riders may initially
decrease the burden on the INS,'14 each alien affected by the New
Rules can be expected to seek reauthorization.142 Thus, the adminis-

Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 299-300 (1981) (summary orders
to cease mining activities are justified as an emergency action to protect public health
and safety); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (removing drunk drivers
from the road is a sufficient government interest to justify no prior hearing); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977) (interest in school discipline justifies not
holding prior hearings for physical punishment).
In the case of aliens subjected to no-work riders, the government maintains a
strong interest in preventing the displacement of the American worker. In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 555 (Att'y Gen. 1974); 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144
(1983); id. at 8820; see National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, No. 837927, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983). This governmental interest, however, is
unsubstantiated. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. Thus, this threat
should be outweighed by the seriousness of the individual's interest and the high risk
of erroneous deprivation. National Centerfor Immigrants Rights, Inc., slip op. at 9.

134. In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 555 (Att'y Gen. 1974); 48 Fed.
Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983); id. at 8820; see National Center for Immigrants Rights,
Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983).
135. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
136. S. Rep. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983).
137. See 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983); id. at 8820.
138. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976); see Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 620 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
139. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
140. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 2-3, 22-23.
141. Under the New Rules, the District Director no longer must obtain the permission of the Regional Commissioner to put a no-work rider on a bond. Compare 48
Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)) (New
Rules) with 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2) (1983) (Old Rules), amended by 48 Fed. Reg.
51,142 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)). The INS claims
that this revision will reduce its burden. See 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,142 (1983); id.
at 8820.
142. Because the no-work rider totally precludes employment and thus hinders an
individual in supporting himself, see supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text, it
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trative burden will probably increase because reauthorization requests
may well outnumber the instances in which the Old Rules were
applied on a case-by-case basis.1 43 A wrongful deprivation of such a
critical interest, therefore, should outweigh concerns about governmental efficiency.

III. A

CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS: REur~NING TO THE OLD RULES

The legality of imposing automatic no-work riders on individuals
pending deportation proceedings is questionable. Because the historical development of the Attorney General's discretionary authority
suggests that the sole bases for discretion are ensuring appearance at
subsequent proceedings 144 and protecting national security,145 the uncertain impact of alien employment on the domestic labor market is
not an adequate justification for implementation of such rules. 146 In
addition, because of the magnitude of the individual interests involved
and the lack of pre-deprivation safeguards,147 such implementation
violates the individual's due process rights.14 Consequently, the New
Rules should not be enforced.
While an ideal alternative to the New Rules would require some
form of pre-deprivation factfinding by an independent party, this
system may be too burdensome on the INS1 49 and is inconsistent with
the Mathews analysis, which rejects an undue burden on the government. 50 A more practical system, which limits arbitrariness and provides a degree of pre-deprivation due process, is the system under the

Old Rules. The Old Rules did not automatically impose no-work

should be expected that an individual will seek to regain his ability to work. Thus,
the INS may be faced with more applications for reauthorization and a greater
burden than under the Old Rules.
143. Under the old system the no-work riders were rarely applied. Avirom &
Serviss, supra note 15, at 39. The number of individuals who will seek reauthorization in comparison to the number of individuals subjected to the old no-work riders
will probably place a greater burden on the INS.
144. See supra notes 14, 29-31, 36-43 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 15, 32-35, 36-43 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
148. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 3-4; see National Center for Immigrants Rights,
Inc. v. INS, No. 83-7927, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983).
149. Such a system would involve a hearing that nearly duplicates the deportation
hearing itself. NCIR Brief, supra note 4, at 28-29. In the past, the Supreme Court has
declined to require such extensive review. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
348-49 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1970).
150. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 682 (1977); see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979) (rejecting
complex procedures for admission of a child to a state mental hospital because of the
burden on the state).
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riders. 151 When the INS wished to impose a no-work rider on an alien,
the District Director had to obtain prior approval from a Regional
Commissioner by establishing that the circumstances merited such a
restriction. 152 By requiring this showing, the Old Rules provided some
pre-deprivation procedural protection. 15 3 Although the Regional
Commissioner is not an independent factfinder, he at least is a disinterested third party because he is not directly involved in the bond
determination. 154 Thus, the Old Rules guaranteed a degree of due
process protection. In addition, because the Old Rules imposed nowork riders on a case-by-case basis only, a determination whether that
individual posed a threat to the domestic labor market could be
made. '-A return to the Old Rules would not impose an undue burden on
the government. The INS already has the official mechanism required
to handle such pre-deprivation analysis. 56 In addition, an individual
awaiting a deportation proceeding was not afforded an opportunity,
as he is under the New Rules, to rebut the District Director's justifications. 157 A return to the Old Rules is a suitable compromise when the
interests of the individual in avoiding erroneous deprivation of his
protected rights are balanced against the governmental interests of
economic protection and administrative efficiency.
CONCLUSION

Automatic imposition of no-work riders on individuals awaiting
deportation proceedings should not be enforced because such a rule

151. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

152. Appleman, supra note 4, at 4. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
153. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2) (under the Old Rules, District Director had to
receive prior approval of the Regional Commissioner to impose a no-work rider),
amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2),
109.1(b)(8)).
154. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.1, 242.2(a) (1983) (regulations give the Regional Commissioner no direct involvement in bringing the charges or in the bond determination); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (independent factfinder is an
individual not significantly engaged in determination being evaluated).
155. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1983) (displacement of American labor is a factor
to be considered in imposing no-work riders under the Old Rules), amended by 48
Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)).
156. The Old Rules were in effect for over 9 years. See 39 Fed. Reg. 19,201 (1974)
(adoption of Old Rules).
157. Under the Old Rules, no-work riders were not automatic, but once a rider
was imposed the only rebuttal was at a proceeding before an Immigration Judge. 8
C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1983). Under the New Rules, however, the rider is automatic, but
the individual may apply to the District Director for reauthorization before going to
an Immigration Judge. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,144 (1983) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2), 109.1(b)(8)).
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exceeds the discretionary authority granted to the Attorney General in
section 242(a) of the INA. In addition, such a practice violates the due
process rights of the individual. Implementation of a case-by-case rule
for no-work riders effectively safeguards the rights of the individual
pending a subsequent proceeding while limiting the burden on government agencies. This Note, therefore, urges that the INS reinstitute
its prior rules concerning no-work riders.
Charles D. Brown

